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Abstract—Millimeter-wave (mmWave) communications are
highly promising to improve the capacity of modern wireless
networks, while the physical layer security (PLS) techniques
hold great potential to enhance the critical secrecy performance
therein. By carefully exploiting the significant signal difference
between the Non-Light-of-Sight (NLoS) and Line-of-Sight (LoS)
mmWave links, this paper proposes a Sight-based Cooperative
Jamming (SCJ) scheme to improve the PLS performance of
mmWave ad hoc communications. In this scheme, each potential
jammer that has no LoS link to its nearest receiver but may have
LoS links to eavesdroppers is selected with a certain probability
to generate artificial noise such that channel advantages at
legitimate receivers can be achieved. For performance modeling
of the new jamming scheme, novel and efficient theoretical
approximation approaches are firstly developed to enable the
challenging issue of interference distribution modeling to be
tackled, and then a theoretical framework based on stochastic
geometry is proposed to capture the secrecy transmission capacity
behavior under the SCJ scheme. Finally, extensive numerical
results are provided to illustrate the SCJ scheme under various
network scenarios.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, millimeter-wave ad hoc
communications, cooperative jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE explosive growth of mobile devices in the past decadeposes a significant challenge to the capacity of modern
wireless networks. To tackle this challenge, the wireless in-
dustry has advocated shifting wireless communications from
the narrow microwave band below 6 GHz to the extremely
wide millimeter-wave (mmWave) band between 30 GHz and
300 GHz [1], [2]. However, like conventional microwave com-
munications, the secrecy issue of mmWave communications
caused by eavesdropping attacks has also been regarded as
a major concern [3], [4]. Recent research shows that the
physical layer security (PLS) technology, which exploits the
random physical layer features of wireless channels to achieve
information-theoretic security, is highly promising to improve
the secrecy of wireless communications [5]–[8]. This paper
therefore investigates the PLS issue in mmWave ad hoc com-
munications. In particular, we aim to propose effective PLS
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schemes for mmWave ad hoc communications and evaluate
the PLS performance therein.
Although the PLS performance of microwave communica-
tions has been extensively studied (e.g., [9]–[13]), the results
cannot be directly applied to the mmWave communications
due to the intrinsic physical layer features of mmWave chan-
nels [14]–[16]. This motivates researchers to investigate the
PLS performance of mmWave communications. The authors
in [17] considered a planar mmWave ad hoc network with
multiple transmission pairs and eavesdroppers, and evaluated
the average achievable secrecy rate of a single pair. In partic-
ular, the authors investigated the PLS potentials of an artificial
noise (AN)-aided transmission scheme, where each transmitter
allocates a fraction of its transmit power for AN transmission,
and showed that AN may be ineffective for improving the se-
crecy rate. Apart from planar ad hoc networks, research efforts
have also been devoted to the PLS performance evaluation of
other mmWave scenarios, such as 3D ad hoc networks with
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [18], downlink transmissions
of cellular networks [19], downlink transmissions of hybrid
cellular networks [20], [21], where microwave BSs coexist
with mmWave BSs, simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) networks [22] and simple two-hop
relay systems with multiple eavesdroppers [23], [24]. Please
refer to the Related Work section (Section II) for the detailed
introduction of these works.
The above works adopted well-known point processes, like
the Poisson Point Processes (PPP) [17], [19]–[22] and Matern
Hardcore Point Process (MHPP) [18], to model the locations
of nodes, thanks to their ability to enable network-scale
performance analysis. However, to retain the mathematical
tractability of the point processes, these works applied either
no PLS schemes or less effective PLS schemes, like the AN-
aided transmission in [17], [19] and cooperative jamming in
[18], where part of the transmitters send artificial noise that is
equally detrimental to legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers.
These PLS schemes are based on the design disciplines for
microwave communications, while we believe that effective
PLS schemes specific to mmWave communications should
carefully exploit the distinctive physical layer features of
mmWave channels. For instance, Non-Line-of-Sight (NLoS)
mmWave links suffer from much more severe signal attenu-
ation than LoS mmWave links [14]–[16]. Thus, cooperative
jamming schemes can use nodes that have no LoS links (i.e.,
have NLoS links) to legitimate receivers but have LoS links to
eavesdroppers to cause less interference at the former than at
the latter, thus improving the PLS performance. Unfortunately,
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PLS schemes based on intrinsic physical layer features of
mmWave channels (e.g., sensitive to blockage, significantly
different attenuation between LoS links and NLoS links) was
ignored in previous works. This motivates our PLS scheme
design and the corresponding PLS performance evaluation in
this paper.
This paper considers an mmWave ad hoc network where
the locations of transmission pairs, potential jammers and
eavesdroppers are modeled by PPPs. The main contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• By carefully exploiting the significant signal difference
between NLoS and LoS mmWave links, we propose a
novel Sight-based Cooperative Jamming (SCJ) scheme
to improve the PLS performance of the transmission
pairs. With the aim to achieve channel advantages for
the legitimate receivers, in the SCJ scheme, each potential
jammer that has no LoS link to its nearest receiver but
may have LoS links to the eavesdroppers is selected as
a jammer with a certain probability to generate artificial
noise. To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents
the first work that exploits the intrinsic physical layer
features of mmWave channels in the design of PLS
schemes for mmWave networks. It is expected that this
work will shed light on a new approach for the design of
secure mmWave communication systems.
• We adopt the secrecy transmission capacity (STC) [25],
i.e., the average sum rate of transmissions in perfect
secrecy per unit area, as the metric to investigate the
PLS performance of the network under the new jamming
scheme. Existing works mainly assume that jammers
follow homogeneous PPPs, while the jammers in this
paper follow Poisson Hole Processes (PHPs) and the
resultant regions where jammers reside have irregular
shapes, posing a significant challenge to the interference
modeling for legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. To
tackle this challenge, we apply region approximation to
develop novel and efficient theoretical approaches to ap-
proximate the inhomogeneous spatial distribution of the
jammers such that the challenging issue of interference
distribution modeling can be tackled. With the help of the
approximations, we then develop a theoretical framework
based on stochastic geometry to derive the connection
probability and secrecy probability of transmission pairs,
based on which the STC analysis is then conducted.
The results in this paper show that our new approach
for interference modeling under the PHP enables a more
accurate analysis to be conducted for both connection
probability and secrecy probability.
• Finally, we provide extensive numerical results to illus-
trate the effectiveness of the approximations as well as the
optimal STC performances of the proposed SCJ scheme
under various network scenarios. The results showed that
our scheme can improve the network STC performance
and outperforms the typical partial jamming scheme in
terms of both STC and energy efficiency performances.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the related work and Section III presents the
system model as well as the SCJ scheme. To facilitate the
theoretical analysis, we consider a simplified scenario with
only one transmission pair in Section IV. The theoretical
analysis for the general scenario is presented in Section V. We
provide numerical results in Section VI and finally conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Extensive research efforts have been devoted to the study
of PLS issue in mmWave communications, which can be
roughly classified into two categories depending on whether
the network model and performance analysis are based on
stochastic geometry or not.
In stochastic geometry-based works, the locations of legiti-
mate nodes (e.g., transmitters, BSs, receivers) and eavesdrop-
pers are usually modeled by independent and homogenous
PPPs to characterize large-scale network scenarios, like ad hoc
networks and cellular networks. The subsequent description
of the related works is based on this prerequisite, unless
stated otherwise. As introduced in the previous section, the
authors in [17] considered a planar ad hoc network with
multiple transmission pairs and eavesdroppers, and evaluated
the average achievable secrecy rate under a simple AN-
based transmission scheme, where each transmitter allocates
a fraction of its transmit power to radiate AN. In [18], a 3D
ad hoc network was considered, where BS-like UAVs, whose
locations are modeled by an MHPP rather than a PPP, transmit
to ground receivers in the presence of ground eavesdroppers.
The authors then investigated the secrecy rate performance
under a simple cooperative jamming scheme, where part of
the UAVs generate AN irrespective of their link conditions to
the ground receivers. Considering the downlink transmission
of a cellular network, the authors in [19] analyzed the secure
connectivity probability and average number of perfect links
per unit area in the noise-limited scenario under both non-
colluding and colluding eavesdropping cases. In addition, they
also investigated the average number of perfect links per unit
area in the interference-limited scenario under only the non-
colluding case and a simple AN scheme similar to the one in
[17]. A hybrid cellular network, where mmWave BSs coexist
with microwave BSs, was considered in [20] and the PLS
performances of connection outage probability, secrecy outage
probability and secrecy rate were studied. The hybrid cellular
network scenario was also considered in [21], while, different
from the passive eavesdroppers in [20], the eavesdroppers here
send pilot signals during the channel training phase to improve
the quality of intercepted signals. Connection and secrecy
performances were then investigated under this new attacking
scenario. The downlink transmissions of an SWIPT cellular
network were examined in [22], where BSs can simultaneously
send information and transfer power to user devices. The per-
formances of energy-information coverage probability, secrecy
probability and secrecy throughput were also investigated
under non-colluding or colluding eavesdropping cases.
Note that the above works adopted either no PLS schemes or
ineffective AN and cooperative jamming schemes, where the
3noise or jamming signals are equally detrimental to both the
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers, failing to create chan-
nel advantages for the former. The main reason is to ensure the
mathematical tractability of the point processes (e.g., PPPs and
MHPPs), since the adopted schemes lead to homogenous point
processes of interfering nodes. Differing from these works,
this paper proposes an effective SCJ scheme, which carefully
exploits the blockage effects between jammers and legitimate
receivers to create better legitimate channels. As a result, the
point process of the jammers becomes inhomogeneous, and
thus new and dedicated theoretical analysis is required to
model the interference from the jammers in our scenario.
Apart from the above works, there also exist some other
stochastic geometry-based works focusing on multiple-input
multiple-output transmissions [23], [26], SWIPT transmissions
[24], relaying transmissions [27] and cognitive radio networks
[28]. However, different from the above ones, these works
considered only one or two source-destination pairs. In ad-
dition to the stochastic geometry-based works, some works
have also been done in relatively simple scenarios with only
a few nodes. For example, the authors in [29] considered a
simple network with only one source equipped with multiple
antennas, one destination and one eavesdropper, both having
a single antenna. The PLS performances of secrecy outage
probability and secrecy throughput were evaluated under three
beamforming schemes, namely, maximum ratio transmitting
(MRT) beamforming, AN beamforming and partial MRT
beamforming. This work was partially extended in [30] by
adding a multi-antenna relay. In [31], the authors considered
the secrecy issue of a secondary transmission pair in a cogni-
tive system, which shares the spectrum of a primary pair while
controlling its power to avoid impairing the transmission of
the primary pair. For PLS performance evaluation, the authors
derived the secrecy outage probability of the secondary pair.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SIGHT-BASED COOPERATIVE
JAMMING SCHEME
A. Network Model
We consider an mmWave ad hoc network over R2, where
the locations of transmitters, potential jammers and eavesdrop-
pers are modeled by independent and homogenous PPPs ΦT ,
ΦP and ΦE with densities λT , λP and λE , respectively. Each
transmitter has a receiver located at a fixed distance r0 away
but at a random orientation. According to [32], the locations
of the receivers can be modeled by another independent and
homogenous PPP ΦR with density λR = λT . We assume
that the locations of the legitimate nodes (i.e., transmitters,
receivers and potential jammers) are known, while those of the
eavesdroppers are not. We also assume that the eavesdroppers
are passive and non-colluding, i.e., decoding messages based
on their own observations without sending signals, and the
transmitting nodes (i.e., the transmitters and jammers) transmit
with the same power P .
B. Antenna Model
To approximate the antenna patterns of the legitimate nodes,
we adopt the sectored antenna model [33], [34], where each
antenna consists of a main lobe and a back lobe. We define
the beam width of the main lobe, the main lobe gain and back
lobe gain of the transmitting nodes’ antennas by θT , GT and
gT (GT > gT ), and those of the receivers’ antennas by θR,
GR and gR (GR > gR). We assume that the transmitter and
receiver of each pair have properly steered their antennas to
obtain the maximum antenna gain GTGR before transmission.
Since the PPPs ΦT , ΦR and ΦP are isotropic, the random
effective antenna gain between a transmitting node (i.e., a
transmitter or jammer) and a receiver is
G =

GTGR, w.p. qGTGR =
θT
2π
θR
2π
GT gR, w.p. qGT gR =
θT
2π
2π−θR
2π
gTGR, w.p. qgTGR =
2π−θT
2π
θR
2π
gT gR, w.p. qgT gR =
2π−θT
2π
2π−θR
2π
, (1)
where qg (g ∈ {GTGR, GT gR, gTGR, gT gR}) denotes the
probability of G = g.
Similarly, eavesdropper antennas are also characterized by
the sectored antenna model, and the random effective antenna
gain between an eavesdropper and a transmitting node is
GE =

GTGE , w.p. qGTGE =
θT
2π
θE
2π
GT gE , w.p. qGT gE =
θT
2π
2π−θE
2π
gTGE , w.p. qgTGE =
2π−θT
2π
θE
2π
gT gE, w.p. qgT gE =
2π−θT
2π
2π−θE
2π
, (2)
where qgˆ (gˆ ∈ {GTGE , GT gE, gTGE , gT gE}) denotes the
probability of G = gˆ, GE (resp. gE) denotes the main (resp.
back) lobe gain and θE denotes the main beam width of
eavesdroppers.
C. Blockage and Propagation Model
To depict the blockage effect, we adopt the LoS ball model
[19], [34], [35], where a link of length r is LoS (resp. NLoS)
with probability pL (resp. 1−pL) if r ≤ D and with probability
0 (resp. 1) otherwise, i.e., if r > D. Here, D denotes the
radius of LoS balls. We assume that r0 ≤ D and the links
of the transmission pairs are LoS throughout this paper. The
blockage effect results in different path loss for LoS and
NLoS links, of which the exponents are denoted by αL and
αN , respectively. Besides, the mmWave links also suffer from
multi-path fading, which is characterized by the Nakagami-m
fading model. Thus, the channel gain hbx,y of a link x → y
follows the gamma distribution Γ(Nb, Nb) with shape Nb and
rate Nb, where b = L (resp. b = N ) for LoS (resp. NLoS)
links.
D. Sight-based Cooperative Jamming (SCJ) Scheme
The SCJ scheme aims to select jammers that are expected
to generate more interference at the eavesdroppers than at the
receivers. Since the locations of eavesdroppers are unknown,
the potential jammers cannot measure their interference to the
eavesdroppers. Thus, the selection is solely based on the in-
terference to the receivers. To measure such interference, each
potential jammer associates itself with the nearest receiver
and observes the distance d and link l between them. For
4a potential jammer y ∈ ΦP , if d > D, then y has no LoS
link to any receiver and thus will cause little interference to
the receivers. In this case, y chooses to become a jammer.
If d ≤ D and l is NLoS, y will cause slight interference
to its nearest receiver but may cause severe interference to
other receivers when y is inside the LoS ball of more than
one receiver. To control the interference to other receivers, y
chooses to become a jammer with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]. In
other cases, y will cause severe interference to the receivers
and thus remains silent.
Note that the association policy is designed to select the
associated receiver for a given potential jammer (rather than
selecting associated jammer for a given receiver), with the
purpose of reducing as much as possible the interference to
other legitimate receivers. Thus, a natural association policy
is to select the nearest receiver. This is because if a potential
jammer causes no or little interference to its nearest receiver,
it would also cause no or little interference to other receivers
as well. The proposed scheme can be also applied to the
mmWave cellular network scenario, since the mmWave cel-
lular networks share some common features with the network
scenario considered in this paper. For instance, in the uplink
transmission scenarios where BSs serve as receivers, idle
mobile devices can be the potential jammers. By applying
the proposed scheme to this scenario, the channel advantages
can be created for BSs, leading to an enhancement of STC
performance therein.
We define the region covered by the LoS balls of all the
receivers by B =
⋃
x∈ΦR
B(x,D), where B(x,D) = {x′ ∈
R
2 : ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ D} denotes the LoS ball of x. According
to the SCJ scheme, each potential jammer becomes a jammer
with probability ρpN , where pN = 1−pL, if it is inside B, and
with probability 1 otherwise. Thus, the locations of jammers
can be equivalently modeled by a homogeneous PPP ΦJ with
density λJ = ρpNλP plus an independent Poisson Hole
Process (PHP) ΨJ . The process ΨJ is formed by removing the
nodes in B from another independent and homogenous PPP
Φ¯J (called baseline PPP) with density λ¯J = (1 − ρpN)λP .
Formally, ΨJ can be defined by ΨJ = Φ¯J ∩ B
c = {y ∈ Φ¯J :
y /∈ B}.
E. Performance Metrics
The transmission pairs apply the Wyner encoding scheme
[36] to protect their confidential messages. When sending a
confidential message, a transmitter x chooses a codeword rate
Rs for this message and another codeword rate Rt for the
entire transmitted message. The difference Re = Rt − Rs
reflects the cost for confusing the eavesdroppers. We assume
Rt and Rs are fixed throughout this paper. Due to the random
channel condition, the corresponding receiver y succeeds in
decoding the transmitted message with a certain probability.
This probability is called connection probability [19] and
defined by
pc = P(SINRx,y ≥ 2
Rt − 1), (3)
where SINRx,y denotes the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise
Ratio (SINR) from x to y. Similarly, eavesdroppers fail to
obtain any information from the confidential message with a
certain probability. This probability is called secrecy proba-
bility [19] and defined by the probability that no eavesdropper
can decode the confidential message, that is,
ps = P
( ⋂
z∈ΦE
SINRx,z ≤ 2
Re − 1
)
, (4)
where SINRx,z denotes the SINR from x to an eavesdropper
z ∈ ΦE . Note that the concrete expressions of SINRx,y and
SINRx,z will be determined in the subsequent sections where
x, y and z are clearly defined. Using these probabilities, we
define another metric, called secrecy transmission capacity
(STC) [25], to characterize the average sum rate of the
transmissions in perfect secrecy per unit area. Formally, the
STC can be formulated as
R¯s = pcps(Rt −Re)λT . (5)
This papers uses the STC R¯s as the metric to evaluate
the secrecy performance, for which we need to derive the
connection probability pc and secrecy probability ps of a
typical pair, respectively.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS: SIMPLIFIED SCENARIO
To facilitate the STC analysis of the general scenario, we
consider a simplified scenario with only one transmission pair
and derive the pc and ps in Sections IV-A and IV-B, respec-
tively. The simplified scenario provides an intuitive insight into
the main idea of the proposed SCJ scheme and makes it easier
for readers to see the superiority of the SCJ scheme in terms
of STC performance. In addition, by introducing some basic
theoretical results in the simplified scenario, we can focus
more on the derivations of the key theoretical results in the
general scenario, so that the readers can easily understand the
main idea of our theoretical analysis without being lost in the
cumbersome and tedious mathematical derivations.
A. Connection Probability
We define x0 and y0 the transmitter and receiver of the pair,
respectively. The SINR of y0 can be given by
SINRx0,y0 =
GTGRh
L
x0,y0r
−αL
0
Iy0ΦJ + I
y0
ΨJ
+ σ2/P
, (6)
where σ2 denotes the variance of the noise and Iy0ΦJ (resp.
Iy0ΨJ ) is the interference from the jammers in ΦJ (resp.ΨJ ). To
obtain the connection probability, we first derive the Laplace
transform of Iy0ΦJ and I
y0
ΨJ
in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. The Laplace transform LIy0
ΦJ
(s) of Iy0ΦJ in the
simplified scenario is
LIy0
ΦJ
(s) = exp
(
− 2πλJ
∑
g
qg
∫ ∞
0
FN (sg, r)rdr
)
, (7)
where
Fb(x, r) = 1−
(
1 +
x
Nbrαb
)−Nb
, (8)
b ∈ {L,N}, g ∈ {GTGR, GT gR, gTGR, gTgR} and qg is
given in (1).
5Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The Laplace transform LIy0
ΨJ
(s) of Iy0ΨJ in the
simplified scenario is
LIy0
ΨJ
(s) = exp
(
− 2πλ¯J
∑
g
qg
∫ ∞
D
FN (sg, r)rdr
)
, (9)
where
FN (x, r) = 1−
(
1 +
x
NNrαN
)−NN
, (10)
g ∈ {GTGR, GT gR, gTGR, gT gR} and qg is given in (1).
Proof: This proof follows from Lemma 1.
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we now derive the upper bound
on the connection probability of the transmission pair.
Theorem 1. The connection probability of the transmission
pair in the simplified scenario can be upper bounded by
pc ≤
NL∑
k=1
(
NL
k
)
(−1)k+1e−
kµσ2
P LIy0
ΦJ
(kµ)LIy0
ΨJ
(kµ),(11)
where µ =
τLr
αL
0
(2Rt−1)
GTGR
, τL = NL(NL!)
−1/NL , LIy0
ΦJ
(·) is
given by (7) and LIy0
ΨJ
(·) is given by (9).
Proof: Based on the definition in (3), we have
pc = P
(
hLx0,y0 ≥
(2Rt − 1)rαL0
GTGR
(Iy0ΦJ + I
y0
ΨJ
+ σ2/P )
)
(a)
≤ 1− EIy0
ΦJ
,I
y0
ΨJ
[(
1− e
−µ(I
y0
ΦJ
+I
y0
ΨJ
+σ2/P )
)NL]
=
NL∑
k=1
(
NL
k
)
(−1)k+1e−kµ
σ2
P LIy0
ΦJ
(kµ)LIy0
ΨJ
(kµ),(12)
where (a) follows from the Lemma 1 in [34].
B. Secrecy Probability
The PPP ΦE inside the LoS ball B(x0, D) can be di-
vided into independent sub-PPPs Φb,gˆE,I with density pbqgˆλE
(b ∈ {L,N} and gˆ ∈ {GTGE , GT gE , gTGE , gT gE}) due to
the independent thinning by the blockage effect and antenna
gains, while the PPP ΦE outside B(x0, D) can be divided into
sub-PPPs ΦN,gˆE,O with density qgˆλE , because these eavesdrop-
pers have only NLoS links to x0. Since these sub-PPPs are
independent, we can formulate the secrecy probability as
ps =
∏
b
∏
gˆ
P
(
∩z∈Φb,ˆgE,I
SINRb,gˆx0,z ≤ 2
Re − 1
)
(13)
×
∏
gˆ
P
(
∩z∈ΦN,ˆg
E,O
SINRN,gˆx0,z ≤ 2
Re − 1
)
,
where SINRb,gˆx0,z denotes the SINR of an eavesdropper z with
link condition b (i.e., LoS or NLoS) and antenna gain gˆ to x0.
Here, SINRb,gˆx0,z is given by
SINRb,gˆx0,z =
gˆhbx0,z‖x0 − z‖
−αb∑
ϕ∈{ΦJ ,ΨJ}
Izϕ + σ
2/P
, (14)
where Izϕ (ϕ ∈ {ΦJ ,ΨJ}) denotes the interference at z from
ϕ∩B(z,D). For ϕ = ΦJ , LIz
ΦJ
(s) can be obtained based on
Lemma 1. We summarize the result in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The Laplace transform LIz
ΦJ
(s) of IzΦJ in the
simplified scenario is
LIz
ΦJ
(λJ , s)=exp
(
−2πλJ
∑
b
∑
gˆ
pbqgˆ
∫ D
0
Fb(sgˆ, r)rdr
)
× exp
(
−2πλJ
∑
gˆ
qgˆ
∫ ∞
D
FN (sgˆ, r)rdr
)
,(15)
where Fb(·, ·) is given by (10).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 and thus
omitted here.
z
x0y0
r0
re||z
-y 0
||
B(z,D)
B(y0,D)
Fig. 1. Illustration of jammers inside B(z,D) removed by B(y0,D).
Next, we derive the Laplace transform LIz
ΨJ
(s) of IzΨJ .
According to the SCJ scheme, some jammers inside the LoS
ball B(z,D) of the eavesdropper z will be removed by the
LoS ball B(y0, D) of the receiver y0 (as shown in Fig. 1),
if the distance ‖z − y0‖ between z and y0 is smaller than
2D. Thus, LIz
ΨJ
(s) depends on ‖z−y0‖ and thus the distance
‖z−x0‖ between x0 and z, because ‖z−y0‖ can be expressed
by ‖z − x0‖ and the link distance r0 between x0 and y0.
Denoting ‖z − x0‖ as re, we rewrite LIz
ΨJ
(s) as LIz
ΨJ
(s, re)
and derive its expression in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The Laplace transform LIz
ΨJ
(s, re) of I
z
ΨJ
in the
simplified scenario is
LIz
ΨJ
(s, re)=
∫ re+r0
|re−r0|
e−λ¯J
∑
b
∑
g
pbqgˆT (s,u)
e−λ˜J
∑
gˆ
qgˆT2(s,u)h(u)du, (16)
where
T1(s, u) = 2π
∫ D
C1(u)
Fb(sgˆ, r)rdr (17)
−2
∫ D
C2(u)
Fb(sgˆ, r) arccos
(
u2+r2−D2
2ur
)
rdr,
T2(s, u) = 2π
∫ ∞
D
FN (sgˆ, r)rdr (18)
−2
∫ u+D
C3(u)
FN (sgˆ, r) arccos
(
u2 + r2 −D2
2ur
)
rdr,
6C1(u) = min{D,max{0, D−u}}, C2(u) = min{D,max{u−
D,D − u}}, C3(u) = max{D, u−D} and
h(u) =
2u
π
√
4r20r
2
e − (r
2
0 + r
2
e − u
2)2
. (19)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Based on Lemmas 3 and 4, we derive the lower bound on
the secrecy probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The secrecy probability ps of the transmission
pair in the simplified scenario can be lower bounded by
ps≥ exp
(
− 2πλE
∑
b
∑
gˆ
pbqgˆ
Nb∑
k=1
(
Nb
k
)
(−1)k+1 (20)
∫ D
0
e−kνbr
αb
e
σ2
P LIz
ΦJ
(λJ , kνbr
αb
e )LIzΨJ
(kνbr
αb
e , re)redre
)
× exp
(
− 2πλE
∑
gˆ
qgˆ
NN∑
k=1
(
NN
k
)
(−1)k+1
∫ ∞
D
e−kνN r
αN
e
σ2
P LIz
ΦJ
(λJ , kνNr
αN
e )LIzΨJ
(kνNr
αN
e , re)redre
)
,
where νb =
τb(2
Re−1)
gˆ
, τb = Nb(Nb!)
−1/Nb , LIz
ΦJ
(·) is given
by Lemma 3 and LIz
ΨJ
(·, ·) by Lemma 4.
Proof: See Appendix C.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS USED IN SIMULATIONS.
Parameters Value
Link distance r0 100 m
Channel bandwidth 1 GHz
Noise spectral density −174 dBm/Hz
Common transmit power P 1 W (i.e., 30 dBm)
Path loss exponent αL (αN ) 2 (4)
Nakagami fading parameter NL (NN ) 3 (2)
LoS probability pL 0.2
LoS ball radius D 200 m
Main lobe beam width θT (θR) pi/6 (pi/6)
Main lobe gain GT (GR, GE ) 10 (10, 10)
Back lobe gain gT (gR, gE) 0.1 (0.1, 0.1)
The bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 are validated by Monte
Carlo simulations based on the simulator in [37] under dif-
ferent values of λP , λE , Rt and Re. For simulation, we
consider an urban environment and summarize in Table I the
related environment parameters. Here, the setting of D = 200
[m] corresponds to the urban area of Manhattan [38], which
provides good fit for real-world scenarios. The simulation
results as well as the theoretical ones are shown in Fig. 2,
from which we can see that the theoretical results match nicely
with the simulation ones, implying that the bounds are tight
enough to be used as approximations.
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Fig. 2. Validation of the bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 with ρ = 1.0 and
λE = 0.005 based on Monte Carlo simulation. Simulation setting: a circular
network with radius 500 m. Each simulation value is obtained as the arithmetic
mean of 10000 simulation outcomes.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS: GENERAL SCENARIO
This section derives the connection and secrecy probabilities
of the general scenario with multiple transmission pairs. We
focus on a typical pair and again define the transmitter and
receiver by x0 and y0, respectively.
A. Connection Probability
In this scenario, y0 receives interference from not only the
jammers in ΦJ and ΨJ but also the concurrent transmitters in
ΦT ∩B(y0, D). Thus, the SINR of y0 is given by
SINRx0,y0 =
GTGRh
L
x0,y0r
−αL
0∑
ϕ∈{ΦT ,ΦJ ,ΨJ}
Iy0ϕ + σ2/P
, (21)
where Iy0ϕ (ϕ ∈ {ΦT ,ΦJ}) denotes the interference from
ϕ ∩ B(y0, D). Note that the Laplace transform of I
y0
ΦT
can
be easily obtained based on Lemma 3, which is given in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. The Laplace transform of Iy0ΦT is
LIy0
ΦT
(λT , s)=exp
(
−2πλT
∑
b
∑
g
pbqg
∫ D
0
Fb(sg, r)rdr
)
× exp
(
−2πλT
∑
g
qg
∫ ∞
D
FN (sg, r)rdr
)
,(22)
where Fb(·, ·) is given by (10).
Proof: The proof follows directly from Lemma 3.
Next, we derive the Laplace transform of Iy0ΦJ . According
to the SCJ scheme, the LoS ball B(y0, D) of y0 may contain
jammers that are not associated with y0, i.e., jammers that
are closer to other receivers than y0. We call these jammers
non-associated jammers and the region where they reside
non-associated region. Fig. 3 shows an example of the non-
associated region, where yi denotes the i−th closest receiver
7y1
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Fig. 3. Approximation of associated region. yi (i = 1, 2, · · · ): the i-th nearest
receiver to y0; Vi: random distance between yi and y0.
to y0 and Vi denotes the corresponding random distance.
As shown in Fig. 3, the shape of the non-associated region
is irregular, making it difficult to derive the exact Laplace
transform of Iy0ΦJ . Thus, we resort to a good approximation,
which is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. The Laplace transform of Iy0ΦJ in the general
scenario can be approximated by
LIy0
ΦJ
(s) ≈ exp
(
− 2πλJ
∑
g
qg
∫ ∞
0
FN (sg, r)rdr
)
(23)
×
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
v1
exp
(
− 2pLλJ
∑
g
qgQ1(s, v1)
)
exp
(
− 2ξ(v2)pLλJ
∑
g
qgQ2(s, v1, v2)
)
fV1,V2(v1, v2)dv2dv1,
where
Q1(s,v1)=
∫ D
min{
v1
2
,D}
(
FL(sg, r)−FN (sg, r)
)
(24)
arccos
(v1
2r
)
rdr,
Q2(s,v1,v2)=
∫ D
min{
v2
2
,D}
(
FL(sg, r)−FN (sg, r)
)
(25)(
π − arccos
( v1
2r
))
rdr,
ξ(v2) = min
{2λR ∫ 2Dv2 A(r)rdr
D2 − (v2/2)2
, 1
}
, (26)
A(r) = D2 arccos
( r
2D
)
−
r
2
√
D2 −
(r
2
)2
, (27)
fV1,V2(v1, v2) = (2πλR)
2v1v2 exp
(
−λRπv
2
2
)
. (28)
Proof: The idea is partitioning the LoS ball B(y0, D)
into three parts as illustrated in Fig. 3, i.e., the non-associated
region A1, where the jammers are associated with y1, the
ring-like partially associated region A2, where part of the
jammers are associated with the remaining receivers yi (i =
2, 3, · · · ), and the associated region A3, where the jammers
are associated with y0. According to the SCJ scheme, the
locations of the jammers in A1 and A3 can be modeled by
homogeneous PPPs. The most challenging task is to model
the locations of the jammers in A2, since each receiver yi
(i = 2, 3, · · · ) carves out a sub-non-associated region from
A2 and these sub-non-associated regions may overlap, forming
an irregular non-associated region (see Fig. 3). To tackle this
challenge, we remove the non-associated region from A2 and
approximate the locations of LoS and NLoS jammers in A2 by
two independent and homogenous PPPs with densities ξpLλJ
and (1 − ξpL)λJ respectively. Here, ξ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability that a jammer in A2 is located in the non-associated
region. For the detailed proof, please refer to Appendix D.
Next, we derive the Laplace transform of Iy0ΨJ . Note that
ΨJ is a Poisson Hole Process (PHP), making it challenging
to derive the exact LIy0
ΨJ
(s) due to the difficulty of accurately
characterizing the impacts of the holes, i.e., the LoS balls
of the receivers. One approach is to consider only the hole
B(y0, D) and neglect all the other holes. This is equivalent
to the simplified scenario. Since the interferers in ΨJ have
only NLoS links to y0 and are far away, this approach
yields accurate approximation. Based on this approach, the
Laplace transform of Iy0ΨJ in the generalized scenario can be
approximated by that of the simplified scenario in Lemma
2. Based on Lemmas 2, 5 and 6, we derive the connection
probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The connection probability of the transmission
pairs in the general scenario is approximated by
pc≈
NL∑
k=1
(
NL
k
)
(−1)k+1e−
kµσ2
P
LIy0
ΦT
(λT , kµ)LIy0
ΦJ
(kµ)LIy0
ΨJ
(kµ), (29)
where µ =
τLr
αL
0
(2Rt−1)
GTGR
, τL = NL(NL!)
−1/NL , LIy0
ΦT
(·) is
given by (22), LIy0
ΦJ
(·) is given by (23) and LIy0
ΨJ
(·) is given
by (9).
Proof: The proof follows after replacing the inequality in
Theorem 1 with approximation.
Using the simulator in [37], we also conducted simulations
for the connection probability under various settings of λT
and λP to verify the effectiveness of the approximation in
Theorem 3. The simulation results as well as the theoretical
ones are shown in Fig. 4. These results indicate that the
approximation is accurate and the analytical expression in
Theorem 3 is effective to model the connection probability
of the transmission pairs in the general case.
For comparison, we also investigate the connection proba-
bilities of the case with partial jamming (PJ), where, according
to the jamming scheme in [18], a fraction ̺ of the potential
jammers send artificial noise. This can be interpreted as the
case where each potential jammer decides to be a jammer
independently with probability ̺. Thus, the resulting PPP of
the jammers is simply an independent thinning of the original
PPP ΦP of the potential jammers. Based on Theorem 3, the
connection probability of the PJ scheme can be given by the
following corollary.
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Corollary 1. The connection probability of the transmission
pairs under the PJ scheme can be given by
pPJc ≈
NL∑
k=1
(
NL
k
)
(−1)k+1e−
kµσ2
P LIy0
ΦT
(λT+̺λP , kµ),(30)
where µ =
τLr
αL
0
(2Rt−1)
GTGR
, τL = NL(NL!)
−1/NL and
LIy0
ΦT
(·, ·) is given by (22).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 3.
B. Secrecy Probability
In the general scenario, the SINR of an eavesdropper z is
SINRb,gˆx0,z =
gˆhbx0,z‖x0 − z‖
−αb∑
ϕ∈{ΦT ,ΦJ ,ΨJ}
Izϕ + σ
2/P
, (31)
where Izϕ (ϕ ∈ {ΦT ,ΦJ ,ΨJ}) denotes the interference from
the interferers in ϕ∩B(z,D). Note that the Laplace transform
of IzΦT can be directly given based on that of I
z
ΦJ
in Lemma
3. Thus, we have
LIz
ΦT
(λT , s) = LIz
ΦJ
(λT , s), (32)
where LIz
ΦJ
(·, ·) is given by Lemma 3.
Next, we derive the Laplace transform LIz
ΨJ
(s) of IzΨJ ,
in which we need to deal with the PHP ΨJ . According to
the definition of ΨJ , each node of the baseline PPP Φ¯J
is retained (i.e., not removed by the holes) with probability
e−λRπD
2
. Thus, one approach to characterize the impact of
holes is to approximate ΨJ by a homogeneous PPP with
density e−λRπD
2
λ¯J . This approach (say Approach 1) reduces
the density of interferers in the neighborhood of z, and may
underestimate the interference to some extent and result in
an upper bound on the Laplace transform, as shown by the
figures (Fig. 7 - Fig. 12) in [39]. Another approach is to
neglect the holes, i.e., approximateΨJ by a homogeneous PPP
with density λ¯J . This approach overestimates the interference
and thus yields a lower bound. To further improve this lower
bound, the authors in [39] considered only the hole closest to
z and showed that the new bound is tight enough. However,
the typical point z in [39] is assumed to be located outside
the holes. As a result, this new approach (say Approach 2)
cannot be directly applied in our case, where z can be inside
or outside the holes. This paper therefore combines the above
three approaches to approximateLIz
ΨJ
(s). Specifically, we first
approximate ΨJ by a homogeneous Φ˜J with density
λ˜J = (βe
−λRπD
2
+ (1− β))λ¯J , (33)
where β ∈ [0, 1], and then carve out the hole closest to z from
Φ˜J . The parameter β here is used to adjust the accuracy of
the approximation. The approximation of LIz
Ψ
(s) is given in
the following lemma.
Lemma 7. The Laplace transform LIz
Ψ
(s) of the general
scenario can be approximated by
LIz
ΨJ
(s, re) ≈
∫ ∞
0
∫ re+r0
|re−r0|
e−λ˜J
∑
b
∑
gˆ
pbqgˆT1(s,min{u,v})
e−λ˜J
∑
gˆ
qgˆT2(s,min{u,v})h(u)f(v)dudv, (34)
where λ˜J is given by (33), T1(·, ·) by (17), T2(·, ·) by (18),
h(u) by (19) and f(v) = 2πλRve
−λRπv
2
.
Proof: We define the receiver closest to z by y˜. Note
that y˜ can be y0 or the receiver closest to z except y0 (say
y∗). Thus, assuming z is at the origin, we have ‖y˜‖ =
min{‖y0‖, ‖y
∗‖}. It follows from Appendix B that
LIz
ΨJ
(s, re)≈E‖y˜‖
[
e−λ˜J
∑
b
∑
gˆ
pbqgˆT (s,‖y˜‖)
e−λ˜J
∑
gˆ
qgˆT2(s,‖y˜‖)
]
. (35)
The PDF of ‖y0‖ can be given by (19) and that of ‖y
∗‖ by
f(v) according to [40]. Substituting ‖y˜‖ = min{‖y0‖, ‖y
∗‖}
into (35) and then taking the expectation in terms of ‖y0‖ and
‖y∗‖ completes the proof.
Please note that our analysis can actually cover the two
approaches in [39] as special cases. For example, the Laplace
transform result of Approach 1 can be obtained by Lemma
3 when setting λJ = e
−λRπD
2
λ¯J and the Laplace transform
result of Approach 2 can be obtained by Lemma 7 when setting
β = 0. Based on Lemmas 3 and 7, we now derive the secrecy
probability of the transmission pairs for the general scenario.
Theorem 4. The secrecy probability ps of the transmission
9pairs in the general scenario can be approximated by
ps ≈ exp
(
− 2π
∑
b
∑
gˆ
pbqgˆλE
Nb∑
k=1
(
Nb
k
)
(−1)k+1
∫ D
0
dre
e−kνbr
αb
e
σ2
P LIz
ΦJ
(λT + λJ , kνbr
αb
e )LIzΨJ
(kνbr
αb
e , re)re
)
× exp
(
− 2π
∑
gˆ
qgˆλE
NN∑
k=1
(
NN
k
)
(−1)k+1
∫ ∞
D
e−kνN r
αN
e
σ2
P
LIz
ΦJ
(λT + λJ , kνNr
αN
e )LIzΨJ
(kνNr
αN
e , re)redre
)
, (36)
where νb =
τb(2
Re−1)
gˆ
, τb = Nb(Nb!)
−1/Nb , LIz
ΦJ
(·, ·) and
LIz
ΨJ
(·, ·) are given by Lemmas 3 and 7, respectively.
Proof: The proof follows after replacing the inequality in
Theorem 2 by approximation.
Simulations based on the simulator in [37] were also con-
ducted under various settings of λT , λE and λP to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the approximated secrecy probability in
Theorem 4. The simulation results as well as the correspond-
ing theoretical ones obtained by our approach and the two
approaches in [39] are shown in Fig. 5. These results indicate
that the approximation in Theorem 4 is effective to model the
secrecy probability of the transmission pairs in the general
scenario. In addition, the results show that our approach gives
more accurate approximation to secrecy probabilities than the
above two approaches in [39], especially for small densities
of transmitters.
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Fig. 5. Validation of the approximation in Theorem 4 based on Monte Carlo
simulation. Simulation setting: a circular network with radius 500m. Each
simulation value is obtained as the arithmetic mean of 100000 simulation
outcomes.
We now justify the superiority of the proposed SCJ scheme
in terms of STC performance enhancement.
Lemma 8. The proposed SCJ scheme improves the network
STC under the general scenario.
Proof: To prove this lemma, we need to show that for
any network with legitimate transmission pair density λT and
eavesdropper density λE , we can properly set the parameters
λP and ρ of the proposed SCJ scheme to achieve a better STC
performance than the case without applying the SCJ scheme.
Obviously, one such setting is that ρ = 0 and λP can be
any value. In this case, no potential jammers inside the LoS
balls of the receivers become jammers. In other words, all the
jammers lie outside the LoS balls of the receivers. Thus, we
have λJ = ρpNλP = 0. For a typical receiver, the jammers
have NLoS links to it and are at least distance D away, so
their interference can be neglected due to the severe signal
attenuation. This is equivalent to the case without the SCJ
scheme where there is no interference from jammers. Hence,
the connection probability in this case is identical to that of
the case without the SCJ scheme. However, this is not the case
for eavesdroppers, since the jammers may be inside their LoS
balls and have LoS links to them. Thus, the eavesdroppers in
this case suffer from more interference than in the case without
the SCJ scheme, leading to a greater secrecy probability. As
a result, the proposed SCJ scheme improves the network STC
performance.
The secrecy probabilities for the PJ case is also given in the
following corollary based on Theorem 4.
Corollary 2. The secrecy probability for the transmission
pairs under the PJ scheme can be given by
pPJs ≈ exp
(
− 2π
∑
b
∑
gˆ
pbqgˆλE
Nb∑
k=1
(
Nb
k
)
(−1)k+1 (37)
∫ D
0
e−kνbr
αb
e
σ2
P LIz
ΦJ
(λT + ̺λP , kνbr
αb
e )redre
)
× exp
(
− 2π
∑
gˆ
qgˆλE
NN∑
k=1
(
NN
k
)
(−1)k+1
∫ ∞
D
e−kνN r
αN
e
σ2
P LIz
ΦJ
(λT + ̺λP , kνNr
αN
e )redre
)
,
where νb =
τb(2
Re−1)
gˆ
, τb = Nb(Nb!)
−1/Nb and LIz
ΦJ
(·, ·) is
given by Lemma 3.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 4.
Remark 1. Note that deriving the accurate results on secrecy
probability is extremely challenging, because this involves the
complicated interference modeling for legitimate receivers and
eavesdroppers under the random point process (in particular
the Poisson Hole Process concerned in this paper), which
remains a long-lasting open problem by now [32]. That is
why the available works (including this work) mainly focus
on the efficient approximation for interferences at legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers and thus deriving bounds on the
secrecy probability, see, for example, [17], [19]–[22].
C. Optimal SCJ Parameters
The most important parameter in the proposed SCJ scheme
is the interference-control factor ρ, i.e., the jammer selection
probability inside the region B covered by the LoS balls of the
receivers. In general, the noise generated by the jammers is
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helpful to suppress eavesdroppers but harmful to the receivers.
Thus, the larger the parameter ρ is, the larger the secrecy
probability ps is but the smaller the connection probability
pc becomes. As a result, there exists an optimal ρ, denoted by
ρ∗, that maximizes the STC R¯s(ρ). Thus, we can formulate
the following optimization problem to find the ρ∗, provided all
the other system parameters (e.g., λT , λE and λP ) are given.
P1 : ρ∗ = argmax
ρ∈[0,1]
pc(ρ)ps(ρ)(Rt −Re)λT . (38)
Similarly, there also exists an optimal ̺, denoted by ̺∗, to
maximize the STC under the PJ scheme. The ̺∗ can be
obtained by solving the following optimization problem.
P2 : ̺∗ = argmax
̺∈[0,1]
pPJc (̺)p
PJ
s (̺)(Rt −Re)λT . (39)
Network designers may be also interested in the optimal
network STC performance under a constraint ε on the total
density of legitimate nodes (i.e., legitimate pairs and potential
jammers). Thus, we also formulate the following two opti-
mization problems to facilitate network design.
P3 : max
ρ∈[0,1],λT+λP∈[0,ε]
pc(ρ)ps(ρ)(Rt −Re)λT , (40)
P4 : max
̺∈[0,1],λT+λP∈[0,ε]
pPJc (̺)p
PJ
s (̺)(Rt −Re)λT . (41)
Although closed-form solutions to these four optimization
problems may not be available, they can be numerically
solved.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides numerical results to evaluate the
optimal STC performance achieved by the proposed SCJ
scheme. We adopt the parameter settings in Table I unless
stated otherwise, and also set the codeword rates as Rt = 8
bps/Hz, Re = 4 bps/Hz and the factor β as β = 0.8 for all
the figures. All results are obtained by numerically solving the
optimization problems in Section V-C.
A. Optimal STC vs. Density of Potential Jammers λP
Fig. 6 shows the impacts of the density of potential jammers
λP on the optimal STC under both the SCJ and PJ schemes.
In this figure, we fix λT as 0.00007 and consider two cases
with different density of eavesdroppers λE , i.e., (λE = 0.0001
and λE = 0.0001). We can see from Fig. 6 that, for the
SCJ scheme scheme, the optimal STC first increases as λP
increases and finally remains unchanged. This implies that
the proposed SCJ scheme can can improve the network STC
performance by deploying more jammers The reason for the
finally unchanged optimal STC under the SCJ scheme is
that, when λP exceeds some threshold, the optimal jamming
parameter ρ∗ decreases to 0. This means that all the jammers
are outside the LoS balls, i.e., the region B, and thus generate
interference only to the eavesdroppers. As a result, as λP
further increases from the threshold, the connection probability
remains constant, while the secrecy probability will finally
increase to one and stay unchanged, leading to a constant STC.
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Fig. 6. Optimal STC vs. density of potential jammers λP .
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Fig. 7. Optimal jamming parameter ρ∗ vs. density of potential jammers λP .
Different from the SCJ scheme, as λP keeps increasing, the
optimal STC of the PJ scheme further decreases and finally
remains constant. The differences between the behaviors of
the two schemes show the benefits of the jammers outside
the LoS balls of legitimate receivers (i.e., the jammers in
ΨJ ) in improving the STC performance. To demonstrate this
expectation, we consider a variant SCJ scheme, named SCJ-
Q scheme, where the jammers in ΨJ remain quiet, i.e., λ¯J
denotes the density of quiet jammers. We compare the SCJ-
Q scheme and the SCJ scheme in terms of the optimal STC
performance in Fig. 6. We can observe from Fig. 6 that the
proposed SCJ scheme achieves better STC performance than
the SCJ-Q scheme, implying that the jammers in ΨJ have a
significant impact on the STC performance enhancement.
A careful observation in Fig. 6 indicates that when λP
is smaller than some value (about 0.00009 in Fig. 6), the
optimal STC achieved by the SCJ scheme is slightly smaller
than that achieved by the PJ scheme. However, when λP is
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larger than this value, the SCJ scheme achieves better STC
performance than the PJ scheme, and the gap between these
two schemes increases significantly as λP increases. This
implies that the proposed SCJ scheme can greatly improve the
STC performance achieved by the PJ scheme by deploying a
large number of potential jammers, showing the effectiveness
of the SCJ scheme in ensuring the secrecy of transmissions at
the physical layer.
Fig. 7 shows the optimal parameter ρ∗ of the SCJ scheme
versus λP under the three cases considered in Fig. 6. We can
observe from Fig. 7 that ρ∗ decreases as λP increases, and
finally decreases to 0. This observation explains the reason
for the finally unchanged STC in Fig. 6, and also serve as
a guideline for setting the value of the jamming parameter
ρ to achieve the optimal STC. Another careful observation
from Fig. 7 indicates that ρ∗ decreases as λT increases while
increases as λE increases.
B. Optimal STC vs. Density of Transmission Pairs λT
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Fig. 8. Optimal STC vs. density of transmission pairs λT .
To investigate the impacts of λT on the optimal STC
performance, we show in Fig. 8 the optimal STC versus λT
under two cases with different values of λP and λE , i.e.,
(λP = 0.01, λE = 0.0001) and (λP = 0.001, λE = 0.0005).
We can see from Fig. 8 that as λT increases, the optimal
STC first increases, then drastically decreases and will finally
vanish. This is because when λT is small, the change of
λT dominates the trend of the optimal STC more than the
changes of secrecy probability and connection probability
do. However, when λT is large, the network becomes dense
and the interference from concurrent transmitters leads to
significantly decreased connection probability. In this case, the
decrease of the connection probability dominates the trend of
the optimal STC more than the increase of the λT does.
Another observation from Fig. 8 suggests that the STC
gap between the SCJ scheme and the PJ scheme is large
when λT is small, and this gap vanishes as λT increases.
This is because smaller λT yields smaller LoS ball region
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Fig. 9. Optimal jamming parameter ρ∗ vs. density of transmission pairs λT .
B and thus more jammers that are outside the B. In addition,
smaller λT yields larger associated regions (as shown in Fig. 3)
inside the LoS balls of legitimate receivers. As a result, the
jamming signals from the jammers are more detrimental to
the eavesdroppers than to the legitimate receivers. Thus, the
SCJ scheme outperforms the PJ scheme in this case. However,
as λT increases, the region B becomes larger and will finally
cover the whole network region. In this case, the associated
region inside the LoS ball of each legitimate receiver vanishes.
Thus, the SCJ scheme is equivalent to the PJ scheme and thus
achieves the same STC performance. The large gap between
the SCJ and PJ schemes for small λT indicates that the SCJ
scheme is more effective when the density of transmission
pairs is low.
Fig. 9 shows the behavior of the optimal jamming parameter
ρ∗ versus λT under three cases, i.e., (λP = 0.0001, λE =
0.0001), (λP = 0.0001, λE = 0.0005) and (λP = 0.0002,
λE = 0.0005). It can be seen from Fig. 9 that the ρ
∗ decreases
as λT increases, which is consistent with the observation from
Fig. 7. This can also help us determine the optimal settings of
the jamming parameter ρ during the system design.
C. Optimal STC and Energy Efficiency vs. Total Density
Constraint ε
This subsection explores the impacts of the total density
constraint ε on the optimal STC performance. By solving
optimization problems P3 and P4, we show in Fig. 10 the
optimal STC versus ε under two cases of λE = 0.0001
and λE = 0.0005. The results show that the optimal STC
increases as ε increases for both the proposed SCJ scheme
and the PJ scheme. A careful observation indicates that the
optimal STC of the PJ scheme finally remains unchanged,
while that of the proposed SCJ scheme keeps increasing,
yielding an increasingly large STC gap. This suggests that
the proposed SCJ scheme outperforms the PJ scheme in terms
of the STC performance under the total density constraint, and
the performance gap between these two schemes enlarges as
the constraint ε increases.
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Fig. 10. Optimal STC vs. total density constraint ε.
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Fig. 11. NSEE vs. total density constraint ε.
The better STC performance of the SCJ is achieved by
deploying more potential jammers, which may consume more
energy. Thus, we need to compare the energy efficiency of
both schemes. To do this, we adopt the metric of network-wide
energy efficiency (NSEE) from [41], which can be formulated
as
NSEE =
R¯s
(λT + λJ + e−λRπD
2 λ¯J )P
, (42)
where R¯s denotes the STC and the denominator denotes the
average power per unit area, including that of the legitimate
transmitters, jammers in ΦJ and jammers in ΨJ . The unit
of the NSEE is bits/Hz/Joule. For NSEE comparison, we
consider the case in Fig. 10 where both schemes achieve
the optimal STC under the total constraint ε. Fig. 11 shows
the NSEE of both schemes versus ε under two cases of
λE = 0.0001 and λE = 0.0005. The results show that the
NSEEs of both schemes first increase and then decrease as ε
increases. Similar to the STC, the NSEE of the PJ scheme
finally remains unchanged, while that of the SCJ scheme
continues increasing. This indicates that the SCJ scheme also
outperforms the PJ scheme in terms of the NSEE performance
and the performance gap between these two schemes enlarges
as the constraint ε increases. The results in this subsection
show the superiority of the proposed SCJ scheme over the PJ
scheme in terms of not only the STC performance but also
energy efficiency.
D. Optimal STC vs. Density of Eavesdroppers λE
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Fig. 12. Optimal STC vs. density of eavesdroppers λE .
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Fig. 13. Optimal jamming parameter ρ∗ vs. density of eavesdroppers λE .
To explore the impacts of density of eavesdroppers λE on
the STC performance, we show the optimal STC versus λE
in Fig. 12 under the setting of λP = 0.001. Three cases of
λT are considered, which are λT = 0.00001, λT = 0.00002
and λT = 0.00003. We can observe from Fig. 12 that the
optimal STC decreases as λE increases. This is intuitive since
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more eavesdroppers leads to lower secrecy probability and thus
smaller STC. The superiority of the SCJ scheme over the PJ
scheme in terms of the STC performance can also be seen
from the figure. Fig. 13 illustrates the behavior of the optimal
jamming parameter ρ∗ versus λE under the same settings of
λT and λP as adopted in Fig. 12. As seen from the figure,
the ρ∗ increases as λE increases. This implies that when there
exists more eavesdroppers in the network, we need to adopt
a larger jamming parameter ρ to achieve the optimal STC
performance.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A Sight-based Cooperative Jamming (SCJ) scheme was
proposed in this paper to improve the physical layer security
performance in millimeter-wave (mmWave) ad hoc networks,
and the related theoretical framework was also developed to
model the secrecy transmission capacity (STC) achievable
from adopting the jamming scheme. The results in this paper
indicate that the proposed jamming scheme can significantly
improve the STC of mmWave ad hoc networks, especially for
networks with low density of transmission pairs. For an SCJ-
based ad hoc network with given densities of transmission
pairs, potential jammers and eavesdroppers, our theoretical
framework can serve as a guideline on the proper settings of
jamming parameter such that the optimal STC performance of
the network can be achieved. Although this paper considers
the nearest receiver association policy, other policies are also
possible, like the smallest average received power policy. Thus,
an interesting topic is the design of optimal association policy,
which serves as one future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Due to the independent thinning by the antenna gains
between the jammers and y0, the jammers in ΦJ seen from
y0 can be modeled by independent sub-PPPs Φ
g
J with density
qgλJ , where g ∈ {GTGR, GT gR, gTGR, gT gR} denotes the
antenna gain. Thus, we have Iy0ΦJ =
∑
g I
y0
Φg
J
, where
Iy0
Φg
J
=
∑
x∈Φg
J
ghNx,y0‖x− y0‖
−αN . (43)
Since the sub-PPPs ΦgJ are independent, we have
LIy0
ΦJ
(s) =
∏
g
LIy0
Φ
g
J
(s). (44)
Placing y0 at the origin (i.e., y0 = oF) yields
LIy0
Φ
g
J
(s) = E
[
exp
(
− s
∑
x∈Φg
J
ghNx,o‖x‖
−αN
)]
(a)
= EΦg
J
[ ∏
x∈Φg
J
EhNx,o
[
e−sgh
N
x,o‖x‖
−αN
]]
(b)
= EΦg
J
[ ∏
x∈Φg
J
(
1 +
sg
NN‖x‖αN
)−NN ]
(c)
= exp
(
− qgλJ
∫
R2
FN (sg, ‖x‖)dx
)
(d)
= exp
(
− 2πqgλJ
∫ ∞
0
FN (sg, r)rdr
)
, (45)
where Fb(·, ·) is given by (10), (a) follows since h
N
x,o are i.i.d.,
(b) follows from the moment generating function (MGF) of
the gamma random variable hNx,o, (c) follows after applying
the probability generating functional (PGF) of the PPP [40]
and (d) follows after changing to the polar coordinates.
Substituting (45) into (44) completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We divide ΨJ into sub-point processes inside and outside
the LoS ball B(z,D) based on the independent thinning by
link condition and antenna gains. Thus, we have
LIz
ΨJ
(s, re) =
∏
b
∏
gˆ
LIz
Ψ
b,ˆg
J,I
(s, re)
∏
gˆ
LIz
Ψ
N,ˆg
J,O
(s, re), (46)
where Ψb,gˆJ,I (resp. Ψ
N,gˆ
J,O) denotes the sub-PPPs inside (resp.
outside) B(z,D). Note that Ψb,gˆJ,I is equivalent to Φ¯
b,gˆ
J,I ∩
Bc(y0, D), where Φ¯
b,gˆ
J,I is the homogeneous baseline PPP with
density pbqgˆλ¯J inside B(z,D). Assuming that the eavesdrop-
per z is located at the origin and defining ΞI = B
c(y0, D) ∩
B(z,D) and ΞO = B
c(y0, D) ∩B
c(z,D), we have
LIz
Ψ
b,ˆg
J,I
(s, re) = E
[
exp
(
− s
∑
x∈Φ¯b,ˆg
J
gˆhbx,o‖x‖
−αb
)]
= exp
(
−pbqgˆλ¯J
∫
ΞI
Fb(sgˆ, ‖x‖)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
)
, (47)
LIz
Ψ
N,ˆg
J,O
(s, re) = E
[
exp
(
− s
∑
x∈Φ¯N,ˆgJ,O
gˆhNx,o‖x‖
−αN
)]
= exp
(
−qgˆλ¯J
∫
ΞO
FN (sgˆ, ‖x‖)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
)
, (48)
We can see that T1 and T2 depend on the distance ‖y0‖
between y0 and z = o. If ‖y0‖ ∈ [0, D), T1 and T2 can
be given by
T1=2
∫ D
D−‖y0‖
Fb(sgˆ, r)
(
π−arccos(
‖y0‖
2+r2−D2
2‖y0‖r
)
)
rdr,(49)
T2= 2π
∫ ∞
D
FN (sgˆ, r)rdr (50)
−2
∫ ‖y0‖+D
D
FN (sgˆ, r) arccos(
‖y0‖
2+r2−D2
2‖y0‖r
)rdr.
If ‖y0‖ ∈ [D, 2D), T1 can be given by
T1 = 2π
∫ D
0
Fb(sgˆ, r)rdr (51)
−2
∫ D
‖y0‖−D
Fb(sgˆ, r) arccos(
‖y0‖
2+r2−D2
2‖y0‖r
)rdr,
T2 is identical to that of the case of ‖y0‖ ∈ [0, D). If ‖y0‖ ∈
[2D,∞), T1 and T2 can be given by
T1 = 2π
∫ D
0
Fb(sgˆ, r)rdr, (52)
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T2 = 2π
∫ ∞
D
FN (sgˆ, r)rdr (53)
−2
∫ ‖y0‖+D
‖y0‖−D
FN (sgˆ, r) arccos(
‖y0‖
2+r2−D2
2‖y0‖r
)rdr
Summarizing (49), (51) and (52) yields the T1(s, ‖y0‖) in
(17), and summarizing (50) and (53) yields the T2(s, ‖y0‖) in
(18). Note that ‖y0‖ ∈ [|re − r0|, re + r0] and the probability
density function (PDF) of ‖y0‖ can be given by (19). Thus,
substituting (47) and (48) into (46) and then taking the
expectation of (46) in terms of ‖y0‖ completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Assuming x0 is located at the origin, we have
P
(
∩z∈Φb,ˆgE,I
SINRb,gˆx0,z ≤ 2
Re − 1
)
(54)
(a)
= E
[ ∏
z∈Φb,ˆg
E,I
P
(
hbo,z≤(2
Re−1)‖z‖αb(
∑
ϕ
Izϕ+
σ2
P
)/gˆ
)]
(b)
≥ E{ϕ},Φb,ˆg
E,I
[ ∏
z∈Φb,ˆgE,I
(
1− e−νb‖z‖
αb (
∑
ϕ I
z
ϕ+
σ2
P
)
)Nb ]
(c)
= E{ϕ}
[
exp
(
− 2πpbqgˆλE∫ D
0
[
1−
(
1− e−νbr
αb
e (
∑
ϕ I
z
ϕ+
σ2
P
)
)Nb]
redre
)]
(d)
≥ exp
(
− 2πpbqgˆλE
Nb∑
k=1
(
Nb
k
)
(−1)k+1
∫ D
0
e−kνbr
αb
e
σ2
P
∏
ϕ
Eϕ[e
−kνbr
αb
e I
z
ϕ ]redre
)
= exp
(
− 2πpbqgˆλE
Nb∑
k=1
(
Nb
k
)
(−1)k+1
∫ D
0
dre
e−kνbr
αb
e
σ2
P LIz
ΦJ
(kνbr
αb
e )LIzΨJ
(kνbr
αb
e , re)re
)
,
where (a) follows since hbo,z are i.i.d., (b) follows from the
Lemma 1 in [34], (c) follows after applying the PGF of
the PPP and (d) follows from the binomial theorem and the
Jensen’s inequality. Similarly, we can prove that
P
(
∩z∈ΦN,ˆgE,O
SINRN,gˆx0,z ≤ 2
Re − 1
)
(55)
≥ exp
(
− 2πqgˆλE
NN∑
k=1
(
NN
k
)
(−1)k+1
∫ ∞
D
dre
e−kνN r
αN
e
σ2
P LIz
ΦJ
(kνN r
αN
e )LIzΨJ
(kνNr
αN
e , re)re
)
.
Substituting (54) and (55) into (13) completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We first calculate ξ as the ratio of the expected area of the
non-associated region inside A2 to the area of A2. Note that
the non-associated region in A2 is the union of many sub-non-
associated regions, each formed by a D2D receiver located
in the region Ξ = B(y0, 2D)\B(y0, V2). To simplify the
calculation, we ignore the overlaps of the sub-non-associated
regions and calculate the area of the non-associated region
as the sum of the areas of the sub-non-associated regions.
Assuming y0 = o, the area of the sub-non-associated region
formed by a D2D receiver y ∈ Ξ is A(‖y‖), where A(·) is
given by (27). Thus, the area of the non-associated region
in A2 is
∑
y∈ΦR∩Ξ
A(‖y‖). Applying the Campbell theorem
[40], we obtain the expected area
EΦR
[ ∑
y∈ΦR∩Ξ
A(‖y‖)
]
= 2πλR
∫ 2D
V2
A(r)rdr. (56)
Since the area of the non-associated region must be no larger
than that of A2, which is π(D
2− (V2/2)
2), ξ can be given by
the ξ(V2) in (26).
Next, we calculate the Laplace transform of the interference
from the three regions A1, A2 and A3. Based on Lemma 1,
we can derive the three Laplace transforms as
LA1 = exp
(
− λJ
∑
b
∑
g
pbqg
∫
A1
Fb(sg, ‖x‖)dx
)
, (57)
LA2 ≈ exp
(
− ξ(V2)pLλJ
∑
g
qg
∫
A2
FL(sg, ‖x‖)dx
)
(58)
× exp
(
− (1−ξ(V2)pL)λJ
∑
g
qg
∫
A2
FN (sg, ‖x‖)dx
)
,
and
LA3=exp
(
− λJ
∑
g
qg
∫
B(y0,D)\(A1∪A2)
FN (sg, ‖x‖)dx
)
.(59)
Also, we need to calculate the Laplace transform of the
interference from outside B(y0, D), which is
LA4=exp
(
− λJ
∑
g
qg
∫
Bc(y0,D)
FN (sg, ‖x‖)dx
)
. (60)
Calculating the integrals in (57), (58) and (59) in polar
coordinates and then multiplying them yields
LIy0
ΦJ
= LA1 · LA2 · LA3 · LA4 (61)
≈ exp
(
− 2πλJ
∑
qg
qg
∫ ∞
0
FN (sg, r)rdr
)
× exp
(
− pLλJ
∑
qg
qgQ1(s, V1)
)
× exp
(
− ξ(V2)pLλJ
∑
qg
qgQ2(s, V1, V2)
)
,
where Q1 and Q2 are given by (24) and (25), respectively.
Note that the joint PDFs of V1 and V2 can be given by (28)
according to [42]. Finally, taking the expectation of LIy0
ΨJ
in
(61) in terms of V1 and V2 completes the proof.
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